aforementioned legal battle, added 150 SEGs that accounted for 65 percent of its membership. 6 Furthermore, while the NCUA's policy was being contested, many federal credit unions changed their charter in order to become geographically based, or residential credit unions, which have a customer base similar to that of a community bank or thrift.
It is widely accepted that the NCUA's support of membership expansion for occupational credit unions in the early 1980's grew out of concern about portfolio concentration risk. That is, a lack of diversification in the customer base (due to restrictive common bond requirements) also leads to a lack of diversification on the balance sheet. Empirical evidence supports, to some degree, the notion that concentration risk is an issue for occupational credit unions. Indeed, both Kohers (1986) and Kohers and Mullis (1986) find that occupational credit unions with sponsors operating in unstable business cycle environments experience higher loan delinquency rates and maintain more liquidity. However, Patin and McNeil (1992) find no difference in loan delinquency rates between Texas credit unions and those operating elsewhere during the "Oil Patch" crisis. This paper re-examines the issue of concentration risk in occupational credit unions using a comprehensive data set for all U.S. credit unions operating as of year-end 1997. First, we update prior research that documents variation in credit union risk by membership bond, focusing exclusively on single common bond institutions. Second, we look at variation in risk among occupational credit unions conditional on their sponsor categories and whether they have added SEGs. Lastly, using a limited survey sample, we test whether the number of SEGs affects our risk measures. Our results provide direct evidence of the benefits of credit union membership diversification. 6 The addition of SEGs has the potential to significantly increase the number of credit union members. For example, 1.5 million new potential credit union members were added through 16,290 SEGs by 1,431 institutions during 2000. (www.cuna.org/data/newsow/00/departments/washington_010600). Adding SEGs can be a relatively simple process and an expedited process exists for potential groups of less than 500 members. The policies for adding SEGs can be found on the NCUA website (www.ncua.gov) in Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement (IRPS) 99-1 and IRPS 00-01.
Background
U.S. Treasury (1997) outlines five characteristics that distinguish credit unions from banks and thrifts. First, credit unions are member-owned, member-directed cooperatives with each member having one vote. 7 Second, credit unions rely on unpaid, volunteer boards of directors elected by (and drawn from) each institution's membership. Third, credit unions do not operate for profit. Rather, they return most earnings to their members through either reduced fees, lower interest rates on loans, or higher interest rates on deposits 8 . Fourth, credit unions have a public purpose as, according to the Federal Credit Union Act, they were established for "promoting thrift among members and creating a source of credit for provident or productive purposes." 9 Lastly, credit unions have certain limitations on their membership based on an affinity among members -a so-called "common bond."
Prior to 1982, membership in federal credit unions was limited to groups having a common bond of occupation, association, or geographic area. Occupational credit unions serve individuals sharing a common employer or workplace. Associational credit unions may include members of a religious congregation, a fraternal organization, or a civic group. Residential or community credit unions may include anyone who lives, works, attends school in, or worships in a single neighborhood, city, county, or metropolitan area. 10 Unlike banks and thrifts, a credit union's survival is often closely linked to the viability of its sponsoring firm, association, or community (U.S. Treasury, 1997) . Further, membership restrictions constrain the investment opportunity set available to credit union managers. 7 The voting structure associated with credit union ownership is distinct from that of mutual thrifts because the latter attributes votes according to the level of deposits. Of course, the fact that credit unions are member-owned and member-directed does not necessarily imply they are member-controlled because of the extreme diffusion of voting rights.
8 While credit unions do not operate for profit, they are profitable financial institutions. Kaushik and Lopez (1996) document that credit unions were at least as profitable as commercial banks and savings banks over the 1989-1992 period. Since then, however, credit unions have generally had lower profitability figures than commercial and savings banks (U.S. Treasury, 2001).
9 Federal Credit Union Act § 101(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1752 (1982) (defining the term, "federal credit union"). 10 Federally chartered residential credit unions may also serve businesses and other organizations within the geographical boundary. See Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement (IRPS) 99-1.
In 1982, the NCUA reinterpreted the "common bond" requirement as allowing occupationally and associationally based credit unions to add SEGs provided each had its own common bond. This policy arose in response to a large number of credit union failures at that time, which stemmed from associated business failures. 11 Over time, many credit unions used this regulatory ruling as an opportunity to diversify their membership and expand their operations. 12 This growth, in turn, drew the ire of commercial banking interests, which subsequently sued the NCUA. This legal challenge culminated in a March 1998 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court, which stated that the plaintiff banks had "standing" to challenge the regulator's flawed statutory interpretation of the common bond requirement. However, the banker's victory was short-lived as in August 1998, President Clinton signed the Credit Union
Membership Access Act that (among other things) expressly allowed for the addition of multiple groups to a credit union's field of membership.
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Since 1998, the NCUA has delineated credit union common bond types by whether the institution has a single common bond (Single-Bond) or multiple common bonds (Multi-Bond). field-of-membership restrictions are a distinguishing characteristic of credit unions. Second (and conversely), these restrictions tend to create significant portfolio concentration risks. This is especially true for occupationally based credit unions, which rely on the continued viability of a single sponsoring firm. Third, this concentration risk has important policy implications because of the nature of deposit insurance for credit unions. Credit unions essentially cross-insure one another through insurance assessments held as deposits at the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (Kane and Hendershott, 1996 and Boldin, Leggett and Strand, 1998) . If those deposits are not sufficient to meet industry needs, credit unions are assessed greater amounts.
Hence, measures to reduce risk concentration are important at both the institution and industry levels.
The extant literature generally supports the notion that credit union membership type influences credit union operating behavior and performance. 15 For the most part, these studies employ limited samples, suffer from methodological limitations or are relatively dated.
However, two more recent lines of inquiry do not suffer from these deficiencies. First, Kohers (1986) and Kohers and Mullis (1986) find that occupational credit unions operating in an 15 See Flannery (1974) ; Black and Schweitzer (1984) ; Keating and Keating (1985, 1992); and Bundt, Chiesa, and Keating (1989) .
unstable (pro-cyclical) economic environment experience lower profitability, exhibit higher delinquency rates, have a larger need for loan loss provisions, and maintain a greater degree of liquidity than their counterparts operating in a stable (business cycle neutral) environment.
Second, Fried, Lovell, and Eeckaut (1993) find that productive efficiency (as measured by a credit union's ability to provide as many services as possible for a given level of resources) is the highest for associational credit unions and lowest for those with a residential common bond.
Since 1982, financial innovation and advances in information technology have led to deeper secondary markets for consumer credit and improved financial risk management. Thus, the degree to which occupational credit unions are riskier than other credit unions deserves a fresh look. We do this by examining variation in credit union liquidity, capital ratios, loan delinquencies, and income variability by way of cross-sectional regressions that hold a number of factors fixed.
Hypothesis Testing
In The risk variables are chosen for the following reasons. First, a credit union's loan-toshare ratio may serve as a proxy for an institution's liquidity risk, or the risk arising from funding illiquid loans with liquid share deposits. Thus, the higher the loan-to-share ratio the greater the liquidity risk. Second, capital ratios may be used as a proxy for the underlying risk profile of the credit union. Such risks include credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, concentration risk, and management and operations risk. Credit unions with riskier assets will tend to hold more capital, therefore we expect a positive relationship between credit union capital and risk, all things being equal. 16 Third, loan delinquencies are related to the degree of informational uncertainty when underwriting loans as well as the credit union's ability to monitor loans.
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Thus, we expect that the tighter (i.e., more homogeneous) the membership bond, the fewer delinquencies are likely to occur. However, during difficult economic conditions, the concentration risk associated with tight membership bonds may offset any informational advantages. Fourth, because the common bond restricts credit union expansion, the volatility of income should be affected by the type of membership bond and the ability to add SEGs. We use the standard deviation of ROA as the measure of income volatility and expect to observe lower volatility in credit unions that have expanded their field of membership.
Following the literature, our statistical model of credit union risk measures also includes variables related to: (1) size, age, charter; (2) portfolio mix; and (3) local economic conditions.
We account for credit union size (LOG OF TOTAL ASSETS) using the natural log of the dollar value of total assets measured in millions of dollars. Larger credit unions tend to be more diversified and employ more professional personnel, thus we expect these institutions will hold 16 Alternatively, one may consider holding less capital to be riskier; perhaps due to the presence of moral hazard arising from deposit insurance. However, Karels and McClatchey (1999) report that the introduction of deposit insurance did not influence the risk-taking behavior of credit unions. less capital and have relatively fewer delinquencies. The natural logarithm of credit union age (LOG OF AGE) is included because newer institutions may underwrite relatively fewer loans and have relatively higher delinquencies due to inexperienced underwriting -perhaps leading to greater income variability. We also expect younger credit unions to have significantly lower net worth as capital is generated exclusively through retained earnings. We also included a dummy variable for newly chartered credit unions (DENOVO) to account for their fragility. Another dummy variable, FEDERAL CHARTER, was included to account for potential variation in regulatory treatment between federal and state authorities.
To capture the risk inherent in the asset portfolio, the percentage of unsecured lending (UNSECURED), automobile lending (AUTO), and first mortgage lending (REAL ESTATE) relative to total loans was included. The relative volume of these three types of lending should be positively related to credit union loan-to-share ratios. Each type of credit presents unique risks that may influence the level of capital held by credit unions as well as the rate of delinquencies. For example, unsecured lending entails a greater risk of credit loss relative to automobile or mortgage lending, due to the lack of marketable collateral. Mortgage loans often result in more interest rate risk because the expected life of the loan is significantly longer than that of unsecured or automobile lending. Mortgage loans also entail less credit risk than other types of loans because of common underwriting standards and relatively greater equity participation by the borrower. Automobile loans represent the predominate class of credit union lending.
Finally, we included two variables to control for the economic environment in which the credit union operates. The first is a dummy variable (NONMSA) that indicates a credit union operates outside of a metropolitan statistical area. Credit unions operating in non-metropolitan areas are less likely to have lending opportunities but may be more familiar with borrowing customers. The other variable is the ratio of delinquent commercial bank loans to total commercial bank loans in the state in which the credit union operates (BANKDEL). Credit unions operating in states that have high levels of delinquent bank loans would likely also have higher risk measures. It is important that we distinguish this from the credit union-specific risk measures. Table 1 [ Table 1 about here]
Are occupationally based credit union's riskier than other credit unions?
Our first set of hypotheses tests examine the effect of credit union common bond type (relative to occupational credit unions) on various risk measures for Single-Bond credit unions.
In other words, we are interested in estimating the marginal effect of associational, residential and other credit union's membership type on various risk measures. We posit that occupational credit unions: (1) have higher loan-to-share ratios than other types of credit unions because the bulk of their members are employed; (2) hold more capital due to the presence of concentration risk; (3) experience relatively fewer delinquencies because of the informational advantages stemming from their tighter (i.e., more homogeneous) membership bond; and (4) have lower income variability during the robust economic period under study.
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The empirical results presented in Table 2 demonstrate that occupational credit unions do have a distinct risk profile. First, these institutions have a loan-to-share ratio that is 11.7 basis points higher than associational credit unions, all things being equal. Presumably, this stems from the fact that most members of occupational credit unions are employed and are, therefore, creditworthy. Of note, however, is that liquidity levels of occupational credit unions are not statistically different from those for the residential or the other category of membership types.
Second, occupational credit unions have capital ratios that are about 1.6 basis points higher than other credit unions and approximately 2.8 basis points higher than either associational or residential credit unions. This suggests that occupational credit unions hold additional reserves in awareness of their potential concentration risk. Third, delinquency rates for occupational credit unions are significantly lower than those for residential, associational, and other institutions: thereby suggesting their informational advantages in underwriting and monitoring loans.
19 Delinquency rates are the highest for associational credit unions. Lastly, the income variability of occupational credit unions is significantly lower than that for associational or residential credit unions but not different from the other category.
These inferences are robust to variation in credit union size, age, charter, and portfolio mix. Overall, these results indicate that: (1) occupational credit unions are potentially exposed to concentration risk which they mitigate by holding additional capital; (2) associational credit unions originate significantly fewer loans, suffer significantly higher delinquency rates, hold less capital, and experience greater income variability than occupational credit unions; and (3) residential credit unions hold less capital, have higher income variability, and have higher delinquency rates than occupational credit unions.
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[ Table 2 about here]
Several other interesting results are indicated in Table 2 . First, larger credit unions (as measured by total assets) tend to be more liquid, hold less capital, experience fewer loan delinquencies and have lower income variability than smaller institutions. These findings may reflect the fact that that larger credit unions are more likely to employ professional management, thus they have better underwriting skills. We also find that federally-chartered credit unions are more liquid, hold more capital, have higher delinquency rates and have lower income variability than their state-chartered counterparts. Consistent with our expectations, credit unions holding more unsecured loans have higher delinquency levels and greater income variability. Credit 19 Looking at charge-off rates, the coefficient on the residential dummy variable remains the same (positive and significant), but the coefficient on the associational and other dummy variables turn insignificant (both were positive and significant in the delinquency regression). 20 We also conducted the same tests using the entire 1997 sample, including Multi-Bond credit unions. We again used the occupational category as the excluded group. The qualitative results were the same. Single-Bond occupational credit unions had significantly lower loan-to-share ratios, higher capital ratios and lower delinquency ratios relative to Multi-Bond credit unions. No significant difference was observed for income variability.
unions holding more auto loans have less liquidity and capital along with fewer delinquencies and lower income variability.
We also find that older credit unions are less liquid, have reduced income variability, and hold more capital. The latter result is consistent with the fact that credit unions are mutuallyowned and must build capital by retaining earnings over time. De novo credit unions have less capital, exhibit fewer delinquencies and have relatively high income variability. Credit unions in non-metropolitan areas are more liquid, hold more capital, have lower delinquencies, and have higher income variability. Surprisingly, the level of commercial bank delinquencies for the state in which the credit union operated did not predict delinquency levels for credit unions. In fact, the higher the level of commercial bank delinquencies in a particular state, the lower the level of delinquencies and income variability for credit unions in that state.
Is there variation in risk among occupational credit unions?
We next focus on the sub-sample of 7,735 occupational credit unions. Specifically, we examine the 4,221 Single-Bond occupational credit unions and those 3,514 Multi-Bond credit unions that identify their primary membership as an occupational group. Once again, we relate our proxies for credit union risk (LIQUIDITY, CAPITAL, DELINQUINCY and STD DEV ROA) to categorical membership variables as well as the nine variables (described previously) that account for variation in credit union size, age, charter, portfolio mix and economic conditions. In this case, the membership variable is defined as follows. The control group in this specification is the Multi-Bond occupational group, which accounts for slightly over 45 percent of all occupational credit unions in number. Single-Bond manufacturing credit unions represent one-fifth of these institutions, while service-oriented (14 percent), government employee (13 percent), educational (7 percent), and military (0.6 percent)
account for the other two-thirds. In light of the findings of Kohers and Mullis (1986), we expect manufacturing-and service-oriented credit unions exhibit the greatest risk. [ Table 3 about here]
We expect that the introduction of SEGs should serve to mitigate concentration risk to some degree, but at the same time reduce a portion of the informational advantages associated with a tight membership bond. As a result, the effect of SEGs on occupational credit unions' loan-to-share ratios, delinquency ratios, and income variability is ambiguous, a priori. We do expect the introduction of SEGs to be negatively related to credit union capital ratios due to a reduction in concentration risk.
The results of our estimation are reported in Table 4 . With a few exceptions, the coefficient estimates on the size, age, charter, portfolio mix and economic conditions variables were similar in sign, magnitude and significance level to those obtained for all Single-Bond credit unions in Table 2 . A couple of differences are worth mentioning. First, for occupational credit unions, age is negatively and significantly related to liquidity where it was positive and significant in the Single-Bond estimation. Second, older occupational credit unions have significantly higher delinquency rates. This effect was insignificant in the regressions on SingleBond credit unions. Lastly, the coefficients on the NONMSA and DENOVO in the liquidity regression were opposite in sign of those reported in the single-bond sample in Table 2 .
The effect of occupational credit union membership bond on risk is relatively consistent.
First the liquidity of Multi-Bond credit unions is lower than all Single-Bond occupational credit unions (educational, manufacturing, service, military, and government). This is consistent with Leggett and Stewart (1999) that note a credit union's non-core, or SEG, members are more likely to be borrowers than its core members. Second, Single-Bond manufacturing credit unions hold more capital and have higher income variability and higher delinquencies than Multi-Bond credit unions. The latter result is consistent with Kohers and Mullis (1986) who find that credit unions operating in unstable business cycle environments experience higher loan delinquency rates.
Third, and also consistent with Kohers and Mullis, we find that government and educational
Single-Bond credit unions have fewer loan delinquencies than Multi-Bond credit unions (both operating in stable business cycle environments). It may be that Multi-Bond credit unions lose some of their informational advantages as they expand their membership base and are less familiar with the members in their select employee groups producing a higher delinquency rate.
Although Single-Bond education and government credit unions have lower delinquency ratios relative to Multi-Bond credit unions (the educational group also has lower income variability), we find their capital ratios are the same or greater than Multi-Bond credit unions. This suggests government-related credit unions hold more capital in light of their potential concentration risk, despite their lower delinquency rates. Interestingly, Multi-Bond credit unions do not differ from Single-Bond military credit unions with respect to capital, delinquency, or income variability.
Overall, the results point to benefits of membership diversification as the addition of SEGs appears to increase investment opportunities and reduce concentration risk.
[ Table 4 about here.]
In order to examine the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the regressions reported in Tables 2 and 4 using data from year-end 1992 . During that year, the economy was in a minor recession that produced a very different operating environment for financial institutions than existed in 1997. While the 1992 results are not reported in the paper, they are quite similar across the two time periods. In the sample for all Single-Bond credit unions (Table 2) , the membership bond coefficients that were significant in 1997 retained their sign and significance levels in 1992. In addition, the insignificant coefficients on residential and other membership bond in the 1997 liquidity equation were positive and significant in the 1992 time period. Thus, occupational credit unions reduced lending relatively more during the recessionary period more than residential and other credit unions.
The results for the sample of occupational credit unions (Table 4) The impact of bank delinquency rates was more noticeable in our 1992 results. While this coefficient was insignificant in the liquidity regressions across both samples (Single-Bond and occupational) in 1997 it was negative and significant in 1992. Thus, during the recessionary period, higher bank delinquency rates implied less lending by credit unions. We also obtained a positive and significant coefficient on the bank delinquency coefficient in the delinquency regressions (Single-Bond and occupational samples) for the 1992 time period (that coefficient was either negative or insignificant in the 1997 time period). This suggests that banks and credit unions were facing a common, exogenous macroeconomic shock at that time.
Does the number of SEGs affect credit union risk?
It's possible that the extent to which SEGs alter credit union risk profiles depends on the number of SEGs added to the credit union's membership base. Indeed, simply distinguishing
Single-Bond and Multi-Bond credit unions may not totally capture the relationship. Our previous approach (above) was necessary because the credit union call report does not include the total number of SEGs added by Multi-Bond credit unions. However, Credit Union National Association's annual survey of credit unions does solicit such information. We used this data to examine a sub-sample of 1,186 Multi-Bond credit unions that identified their primary membership as "occupational" for 1997. Of these 1,186 credit unions, 70 percent reported having fewer than 50 SEGs, while only three percent reported having more than 500 SEGs.
Following Gilley and Leone (1991) , we first examined certain demographic characteristics of the responding sample to determine if it was representative of all Multi-bond credit unions. We found statistically significant differences in the age, asset size, proportion of federally chartered credit unions, the proportion of credit unions in metropolitan statistical areas, and the proportion of de novo credit unions. These five variables were then used in Heckman's (1976) sample selection model to predict the probability of a credit union responding to the survey and in the creation of the Heckman's "lambda" for the second stage least squares regression. This second regression is the one of interest for purposes of testing the effect of the number of SEGs on credit union risk profiles.
The Heckman regression results are reported in Table 5 is also included in each model.
[ Table 5 about here.]
We have three key findings from this set of regressions. First, we find that a larger number of SEGs is associated with higher loan-to-share ratios. This is consistent with less balance sheet liquidity and greater investment opportunities. Second, the number of SEGs is negatively related to credit union capital ratios indicating the benefits of reducing concentration risk through membership diversification. Lastly, credit union delinquency ratios are positively related to the number of SEGs -suggesting that the informational advantages associated with the common bond become diluted as new groups are added. We do not find a statistically significant relationship between the number of SEGs and the liquidity measure and the variability of income. Further, Heckman's "lambda" is statistically significant in the capital and delinquency regressions --indicating the importance of accounting for response bias in these specifications.
Conclusions
Membership in federally-chartered credit unions is limited to "individuals sharing a common bond of occupation, association, or geographic area." These membership limitations tend to create portfolio concentration risks as evidenced by the large number of credit union failures in the early 1980's. The NCUA responded to this situation by allowing certain credit unions to expand their membership by including select employee groups. The 1998 Credit Union Membership Access Act explicitly allowed for expansion of the field of membership and hence the potential to mitigate this risk.
This research was concerned with documenting the unique risk profile of occupational credit unions and the degree to which SEGs have reduced credit union risk. Our various statistical tests uncovered the following.
First, occupational credit unions are potentially exposed to concentration risks, which they appear to account for by holding additional capital. Occupational credit unions also experience relatively fewer delinquencies, perhaps because their members are employed and they have informational advantages over other types of credit unions.
Second, Multi-Bond credit unions identifying themselves as primarily serving occupational members have higher loan-to-share ratios and hold less capital than Single-Bond occupational credit unions. This suggests that Multi-Bond institutions have greater investment opportunities and are subject to less membership concentration risk. Loan delinquencies at
Multi-Bond credit unions are lower than that for Single-Bond occupational credit unions, but greater than that for Single-Bond educational and government credit unions. Multi-Bond credit unions also have significantly greater income variability than Single-Bond educational credit unions but significantly lower variability than Single-Bond manufacturing credit unions.
Third, using proprietary survey data with information on the number of SEGs affiliated with Multi-Bond, occupationally related credit unions, we found a negative relationship between the number of SEGs and capital ratios and a positive relationship with loan-to-share and delinquency ratios. These results indicate that as the number of SEGs increase, the credit union benefits from expanded investment opportunities and reduced concentration risk. However, the informational advantages arising from common bonds may become diluted. T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. T-statistics in parentheses. *Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level.
